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NO. 28 JUNE 2020 Introduction 
EU Border Security in a Time of Pandemic 
Restoring the Schengen Regime in the Face of Old Conflicts and New Requirements 
for Public Health 
Raphael Bossong 
The massive mobility restrictions in the Schengen zone that were imposed to control 
the Corona pandemic are to be lifted from mid-June onwards. If a second wave of 
infections does not follow suit, the German EU Council Presidency may oversee the 
end of all remaining internal border controls. The reform of the Schengen regulation, 
which has been overdue since the migration crisis, can be relaunched. The link between 
secure external borders and internal freedom of movement should have already been 
reappraised. Looking forward, targeted checks on persons for reasons of public health 
must be better coordinated. The forthcoming EU pact on migration and asylum will 
be even more difficult to agree on, however. Access to asylum procedures must be 
guaranteed without fail, despite national responsibility for public health. 
 
In February 2020, when Italy imposed the 
first mobility restrictions due to the Covid-
19 pandemic, the EU Commission rejected 
the introduction of internal border controls 
in the Schengen zone. This was in line with 
the then insufficient risk assessments of 
the Covid outbreak among other EU and 
Schengen member states. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) also recommended 
keeping international borders open. 
However, when the rapid spread of the 
virus throughout Europe – fuelled by 
ski tourism – became apparent, and the 
overloading of the Italian health system 
reached dramatic proportions in March, 
15 EU states and the additional Schengen 
members Norway, Iceland, Lichtenstein, 
and Switzerland announced measures 
to close their borders. These unilateral 
national decisions led to serious economic 
and social disruptions, particularly with 
regard to the cross-border supply of medical 
goods and the role of foreign workers and 
commuters. It was initially not clear how 
severe the restrictions on the free move-
ment of persons and goods would have to 
be or how long they would last, nor whether 
the European internal market would be 
able to cope. 
Some economic costs and intergovern-
mental coordination problems could be 
curbed or defused rather quickly. For exam-
ple, the European Council agreed in mid-
March on a general ban on entry at Europe’s 
external borders in order to avoid secondary 
movements within the Schengen zone. 
Shortly thereafter, so-called green lanes for 
maintaining the smoothest possible cross-
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border movement of goods were installed at 
the suggestion of the Commission. Member 
states were initially reprimanded by the Com-
mission and heeded its subsequent instruc-
tion to not impose any intra-European 
export restrictions or to competitively buy 
up scarce medical goods. 
Member states furthermore agreed to 
allow the cross-border movement of workers 
in critical sectors and to allow all EU citi-
zens to travel home, even if they had to 
cross other member states with closed bor-
ders by land. Finally, a coordinated global 
repatriation programme for almost 600,000 
European citizens was completed in mid-
April. Ten per cent of the costs involved 
were financed directly through the EU Civil 
Protection Mechanism. 
The widely shared impression that the 
EU totally failed in the first phase of the 
Covid crisis, therefore, does not quite hit 
the mark. Member states did not funda-
mentally turn away from the right to free 
movement and tried to limit the damage 
through sustained European dialogue. 
Nevertheless, the EU and Schengen member 
states still present a very mixed picture when 
it comes to permissible domestic and inter-
national mobility. Under these conditions, 
the Schengen zone and the internal market 
remain under threat. The fragmentation of 
the flow of people and goods could become 
entrenched. 
Reasons for Persistent 
Divergences 
The remaining differences in national 
restrictions are evidently not only due to 
the geographical concentration of Covid 
infections, but also divergent political 
assessments. For example, it has not been 
finally settled whether Sweden failed with 
its alternative strategy of openness or how 
restrictive the national lockdowns had to 
be. In any case, the EU does not have the 
legal competence in the area of public 
health – in contrast to the agricultural sec-
tor – to issue orders for uniform disease 
control. The advantages and disadvantages 
of a decentralised organisational structure 
in these matter are already apparent in 
Germany. While the regionally varied ap-
proaches to contact restrictions are being 
criticised, local mobilisation and the related 
considerations of individual circumstances 
have proven to be great advantages in con-
taining the virus. 
Similarly, the objection that border con-
trols are not an effective tool for combating 
pandemics cannot itself justify a common 
policy in the EU. When faced with direct 
human-to-human transmission and the lack 
of a vaccine, it is difficult to convey to the 
public that massive restrictions on local 
freedom of movement have to be accepted, 
while at the same time cross-border mobil-
ity is hardly impacted. The nation-state is 
still the primary frame of reference for 
citizens to voice their demands for protec-
tion – or in which they negotiate the risks 
that are to be borne by society as a whole 
or by the individual. Without ignoring the 
reality of our global risk society, which has 
been highlighted once again by the Covid 
pandemic, the risk management of inter-
national organisations, including the EU, 
must be based primarily on national and 
local structures. The tracing of infection 
chains, for example, functions much less 
efficiently in cross-border contexts. 
Although European law spells out strict 
conditions for border controls, only EU-
wide recommendations can currently be 
justified in the sensitive area of public 
health. The political responsibility and 
democratic legitimacy for limiting funda-
mental rights in the name of protecting 
human lives remain at the national or 
regional level, as do the risks associated 
with relaxation. Strong pro-European 
appeals are of no help in view of the high 
levels of uncertainty. 
A Summer of Opening 
This explained the cautious tone of the 
Commission communications from mid-
May to support a gradual reopening of 
borders between member states. The re-
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gional epidemic patterns and the capacities 
of the national health care systems with 
regard to the detection of infection paths, 
the registration of infection rates (e.g. via 
Covid tests), and the management of the 
progression of severe diseases (number of 
available intensive care beds, etc.) should 
be the decisive factors considered for lifting 
border controls. These parameters should 
be collected and evaluated in all EU coun-
tries with the support of the European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC). Various measures for occupational 
safety and contact minimisation should 
underpin a restoration of the freedom of 
movement. 
The European added value of these rec-
ommendations, however, is questionable if 
no clearer benchmark can be clearly agreed 
upon (similar to the German compromise 
on the upper limit of 50 new infections per 
100,000 inhabitants, above which mobility 
restrictions should be brought back). 
Nevertheless, there is a clear tendency 
to safeguard the economic interests of 
member states and revitalise tourism this 
summer. The remaining political tensions 
over the divergent national approaches to 
relaxing the current restriction should be 
overcome in the coming weeks. 
Driven by debates between its regions, 
Italy has already opened borders with other 
EU member states as of 3 June. Yet, neigh-
bouring countries did not immediately join 
in, even though Germany, Austria, and 
Switzerland already agreed on facilitating 
their respective cross-border traffic in May. 
Similarly, the Scandinavian states decided 
to lift their mutual controls, excluding 
borders with Sweden. 
Germany, though, declared that it would 
lift its nation-wide travel warning from mid-
June and allow entry from all other EU and 
Schengen states – i.e. also without “good” 
reason, as is currently the rule. Almost all 
other EU and Schengen member states have 
adopted similar outlooks. As a rule, they 
had announced internal border controls 
for three months until the end of May, and 
since then they have only continued these 
controls for short periods of time, if at all. 
France had, as an exception, originally 
planned to maintain comprehensive Covid-
related controls until October, but now it 
wants to join the openings from mid-June. 
Spain (late June) and Norway (until mid-
August) should follow suit with a slight 
delay. 
Against this background, the EU Council 
of Ministers decided on 5 June to extend 
the general entry ban at the EU’s external 
borders only until early July. The Commis-
sion has since then invited the member 
states to draw up and regularly update a 
common list of third countries – based 
on an agreed checklist of criteria – from 
which travel to the EU and the Schengen 
zone could be allowed. According to the 
Commission, at least the Western Balkans 
should be exempted from the entry ban for 
non-essential travel as soon as possible. 
In the event of a sustained containment 
of infection rates, the Schengen zone should 
thus be largely open again by the middle 
of summer. This step should be combined 
with the abolition of the general quaran-
tine requirement after entry, not least 
because the tourism industry would other-
wise be decimated. However, national 
authorities reserve the right to carry out 
targeted health checks on any persons after 
entering the country. 
The EU Commission ensures the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination with respect to 
all national decisions to lift mobility restric-
tions. Preferential treatment between states 
that are close to each other – as was dis-
cussed among the Baltic states in May – 
should be avoided. Yet, the warning of Com-
mission Vice-President Margaritis Schinas 
against the formation of new “mini-states” 
has not come to pass. 
From autumn onwards, further reforms 
of the Schengen regime may come into 
view under these circumstance. If the pan-
demic does indeed subside, national room 
for manoeuvre should again take a back 
seat to the common EU legal framework. 
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Old Conflicts in the Schengen Zone 
However, political reservations about open 
borders represent an unresolved problem 
(see SWP Comment 44/2018). Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark, France, Germany, and 
Austria have been carrying out controls at 
sections of their internal borders since the 
end of 2015. On a practical level, these 
security measures have become less and 
less perceptible. Germany, for example, 
generally monitors only two border cross-
ings with Austria. However, this does not 
affect the legal debate on these measures. 
In regular statements to the EU Commis-
sion, the six states insist that weaknesses 
in the EU’s external border protection and 
terrorist threats justify such internal border 
controls. As things stand at present, these 
controls are to be continued until at least 
November 2020. 
Articles 25 to 28 of the Schengen regu-
lation state that the member states may 
restrict cross-border traffic for up to six 
months due to special security require-
ments, as is currently the case in the Covid 
crisis. Semi-annual “chain extensions” of 
such controls are not explicitly prohibited, 
but they are clearly not provided for. This 
can be derived from the provision (Art. 29), 
introduced only in 2013, that internal 
border controls are permitted for up to two 
years if the EU Council of Ministers deter-
mines that the entire Schengen zone is 
systematically endangered. This mechanism 
was exhausted at the end of 2017. Since 
then, irregular immigration and the threat 
of international terrorism have declined 
significantly, so that the deadline for lifting 
internal border controls can also be justi-
fied on substantive grounds. 
During the last legislative period, a 
reform of the Schengen regulation, which 
was intended to define clear time limits and 
tighten the proportionality check on inter-
nal border controls, failed. At the end of 
2019, the new EU Parliament set up a spe-
cial committee on Schengen to keep these 
issues on the agenda. 
The experience of the Covid crisis could 
steer the debate in a new direction. In the 
case of health risks, which are difficult to 
predict, it seems questionable to set fixed 
deadlines for mobility restrictions. The na-
tional responsibility for public order, which 
also includes protection against serious 
health risks, cannot be limited in time. 
However, the emergency-related deviation 
from the regular Schengen regime should 
be as short and targeted as possible. 
In this respect, it is unreasonable to 
maintain national exemptions for internal 
border controls for several years if there is 
no concrete and exceptional threat over 
that period. It is true that the six control-
ling states are confronted with a continu-
ous so-called secondary migration of asy-
lum applicants from countries of first 
arrival, which may justify institutional and 
legal reforms of the Schengen zone. How-
ever, the irregular immigration that is still 
taking place at present clearly poses no 
threat to public order in these countries. 
In view of the harsh pushback of persons 
who have attempted to cross the Turkish-
Greek land border irregularly from Feb-
ruary onwards, or the continually tightened 
restrictions on sea rescue operations in the 
Mediterranean, the lifting of internal bor-
der controls cannot plausibly be made de-
pendent on ever more stringent EU external 
border controls. 
Asylum and Irregular Migration 
The Covid crisis could thus provide a win-
dow of opportunity and a chance to shift 
the political positions of the member states 
on asylum and irregular migration. While 
the EU states were primarily concerned 
with restricting irregular immigration from 
2015 onwards, the value of open borders 
is now coming back to the fore. The crisis 
has also highlighted the economic con-
tributions of foreign workers, including 
irregular migrants. Italy, for example, 
adopted a decree that opens up work per-
mit channels for illegally employed third-
country nationals. 
Overall, however, there is a risk that the 
situation of persons seeking protection will 
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worsen further. International as well as 
non-governmental organisations warn that 
the Covid crisis should not lead to a denial 
of the fundamental right to asylum. The 
appeal is primarily, but by no means ex-
clusively, directed at the countries of first 
arrival in southern Europe. For example, 
Italy and Malta declared in March that their 
ports could no longer be considered safe 
due to the Covid pandemic, and that it 
would therefore not be appropriate to dis-
embark asylum seekers. 
The notion that people who were rescued 
in the international waters of the Mediter-
ranean should instead be returned directly 
to Libya can currently be justified even less 
so than in previous years. At the end of 
May, militias are said to have shot 30 in-
mates of a camp with irregular migrants. 
Military violence in Libya has been esca-
lating for months (see SWP Comment 25/ 
2020), all while there is virtually no medi-
cal capacity available to control the Covid 
pandemic. 
The EU Commission itself is involved in 
many measures that shift migration control 
into the European neighbourhood. As 
recently as the beginning of March, Ursula 
von der Leyen praised Greece’s tough action 
of sealing off its land border with Turkey. 
However, in view of the continuing border 
closures due to the Covid crisis, the Com-
mission has partially corrected its position 
since then. It is now taking a more pro-
active stance to uphold the right to asylum 
enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights. The Commission maintains that 
only procedural restrictions and delays in 
the application process are justifiable. 
If key provisions of the Common Euro-
pean Asylum System are not respected, 
even after the first phase of the Covid crisis 
has subsided, new infringement procedures 
could be envisaged. Though, experience 
has shown that the necessary time span for 
complete infringement proceedings does 
not suffice for the practical challenges at 
hand. This April, for example, the European 
Court of Justice came to a final judgement 
on the matter, according to which all mem-
ber states should have implemented the 
one-time EU decisions of 2015 on the dis-
tribution of persons seeking protection. 
Therefore, the key issue is how member 
states assess their recent experiences with 
unilateral security measures and border 
closures. The past few years have provided 
ample evidence for the negative impact of 
“beggar-thy-neighbour” policies, i.e. the 
consequences of efforts to shift the costs or 
supposed burdens of irregular immigration 
onto other states without contributing to-
wards overcoming the problem as a whole. 
For example, a few dozen or hundreds of 
persons apprehended by NGOs or other 
ships at sea led repeatedly to paralysing 
haggling between the member states. 
The Covid crisis has put a halt to migra-
tory movements of all kinds around the 
world. Yet, in just a few months, a signifi-
cant increase in irregular immigration can 
be expected again due to various socio-
economic distortions and possible new con-
flict dynamics. Even before the Covid out-
break, the situation of refugees in Turkey 
(see SWP Comments 22/2020) and Lebanon 
was very precarious. The domestic crises in 
these host countries have since worsened 
massively. The need for a common, resilient 
approach to irregular immigration and a 
common guarantee of asylum for those in 
need of protection is therefore more urgent 
than ever. However, this realisation and the 
numerous appeals for more European soli-
darity during the Covid crisis are probably 
not enough. 
The EU Commission wanted to present a 
new pact for asylum and migration at the 
beginning of April in order to overcome the 
political blockade that had lasted for years, 
and to achieve a more crisis-proof, resilient 
European system of burden-sharing. This 
did not happen because of the Covid out-
break. The presentation is now expected in 
parallel with the lifting of internal border 
controls in June. 
A central element of this pact is to be the 
development of border procedures in “con-
trolled” or closed facilities. There, a rapid 
preliminary assessment of asylum applica-
tions is to take place in order to then ini-
tiate either direct repatriation or distribu-
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tion to other EU member states, where a 
complete asylum procedure would then be 
carried out. The catastrophic conditions on 
the Greek islands make it clear that new 
first arrival camps must be planned with 
the utmost care and must also guarantee 
health protections. 
It is not only because of such require-
ments that the new pact on migration and 
asylum will remain highly controversial. 
Those states that have so far been funda-
mentally opposed to an obligatory distribu-
tion of asylum seekers will hardly have to 
show any willingness to compromise. In-
stead, the current crisis strengthens their 
tactical negotiating position. The threat that 
states which do not wish to participate in 
EU asylum policy could lose full access to 
the benefits of the Schengen zone has not 
materialised in recent years. The eastern 
European states have an important role to 
play in the reconstruction following the 
Covid crisis, as they must approve all pan-
European financial packages and have 
come through the past months with com-
paratively little economic damage. Espe-
cially for Germany, further distortions of 
cross-border supply and production chains 
do not seem to be bearable. It is therefore 
hardly conceivable that the restoration of 
freedom of movement and openness in the 
Schengen Area can be made dependent on 
solidarity in asylum matters. 
In the foreseeable future, other EU states 
and the European Parliament must there-
fore allow for a very flexible participation 
in burden-sharing in the European asylum 
system. This makes it all the more impor-
tant to uphold generally binding principles 
and standards of asylum law and to actually 
end crisis-related exceptions. This applies in 
particular to offering the chance to submit 
an application for protection at the EU’s 
external borders. 
Border Controls and 
Health Protection 
A new reform of the Schengen regime could 
be launched from autumn onwards, inde-
pendently from the politically salient discus-
sion on the European asylum and migration 
pact. In its current version, the Schengen 
regulation mentions dangers to public health 
only in the margins. For example, the entry 
of third-country nationals may be prohibited 
for reasons of public health protection 
(Article 6 (1)). Non-EU citizens may also be 
subject to systematic checks for this pur-
pose (Article 8 (3)). EU citizens and third-
country nationals with long-term residence 
status can also be subject to checks at the 
EU’s external borders on a non-systematic 
basis, also with a view to protecting public 
health (Article 8 (2)). However, this must 
not lead to a refusal to return home. 
The “Free Movement Directive” (2004/38/ 
EC), which also applies to EU citizens of 
countries that are not full members of the 
Schengen zone, contains some additional 
information (Articles 27 & 29): Accordingly, 
health checks can be carried out up to 
three months after entry if there is justi-
fied suspicion of a threat to public health. 
Comprehensive border closures and police 
measures are not covered by this provision. 
Rather, it forms the basis for a targeted 
regime of contact tracing by public health 
authorities. 
Newer EU actors such as the ECDC are 
not yet mentioned in the 2004 Free Move-
ment Directive. The ECDC has so far had 
rather limited resources, and its work 
depends on information provided by mem-
ber states. However, the ECDC’s work – the 
compilation of an overview of the European 
infection status and the standardisation of 
disparate national data – could be better 
supported and utilised, in cooperation with 
the WHO regional office. 
The primary competence of the member 
states would not be curtailed if the inter-
actions between intra-European checks on 
persons and public health protections were 
to be defined more precisely. So far, only 
non-binding and mostly critical assessments 
of the ECDC have been available on the 
question of whether instruments such as 
health questionnaires, fever measurements, 
or “immunity passports” should be used 
sensibly when entering the EU. National 
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decisions for or against such instruments 
will determine how citizens and third-coun-
try nationals will soon experience cross-
border travel in the Schengen zone. 
It must be clarified whether reliable 
testing for Covid infections can be carried 
out and what capacities are available to the 
Schengen states for health checks at their 
external borders. So far, the Commission 
has only issued a recommendation on how 
the member states should resume visa pro-
cessing, once the general entry ban for non-
essential travel to the EU starts to gradually 
be lifted. This mainly revolves around the 
increasing technical challenges to ensure 
public health during the application pro-
cess, whereas the decision cannot be made 
dependent on individual health checks due 
to the time gap between the granting of 
(often longer-term or multiple) visas and 
actual travel. There have been some inter-
nal discussions whether the coming system 
for an electronic entry permit (European 
Travel Information and Authorization 
System, ETIAS) for travellers who are ex-
empt from visa requirements might also be 
used more extensively for the purposes of 
public health protection. ETIAS would, in 
the future, apply to all citizens of North 
and South America, where the Covid pan-
demic is currently raging. Yet, it now seems 
certain that the launch of ETIAS will be sub-
stantially delayed from 2021 to late 2022. 
The EU border agency, Frontex, will have 
to gear its work and risk assessment more 
closely to public health criteria, however. 
At the end of 2019, a further, far-reaching 
reform of the agency was decided upon – 
the implementation of which will entail 
many challenges (see SWP Comment 
47/2019). Initial approaches to integrating 
health care for people seeking protection 
into regional contingency plans have not 
been substantially developed since 2017. 
The current situations demands a reprioriti-
sation, especially when Frontex begins 
increasingly carrying out repatriations 
under its own responsibility, as foreseen in 
the new regulation. The lifting of the 
general EU entry ban does not mean that 
the health situation in third countries can 
be disregarded. 
Whether international travel can be 
resumed will ultimately depend on the 
prospect of a vaccine being available and 
swiftly distributed globally over the next 
two years. Even though WHO is critical of 
border controls to combat the pandemic, it 
is now likely that technical measures such 
as fever measurements at airports will 
become established. The United States, for 
example, is currently planning procedures 
with private operators. The EU has not yet 
formulated a clear position on this point. 
Since the EU has served, after China, as the 
second major platform for the global spread 
of the Covid virus, further possibilities of 
exit controls could be considered to make 
it easier for third countries to reopen their 
borders. 
Outlook and Recommendations 
The forthcoming end of the EU entry ban 
will be accompanied by wide-ranging re-
laxations within the entire Schengen zone. 
National public health powers and a sus-
tainable containment of Covid infections 
will take precedence over the restoration 
of full freedom of movement within the EU. 
However, if only local outbreaks are to be 
dealt with from this summer onwards, the 
German Presidency will provide to be a 
window of opportunity for removing all 
remaining mobility restrictions. This phase-
out should explicitly extend to those inter-
nal border controls that have been main-
tained by six states, including Germany, 
since the migration crisis of 2015. 
This would send a political signal about 
the value and crisis-proof nature of the 
Schengen zone. In addition, this step would 
support the Conference on the Future of 
Europe, which is now due to start in Sep-
tember. EU citizens value freedom of move-
ment as a particularly important achieve-
ment, especially now after the restrictions 
they have experienced. 
However, the conflicts of principle in 
EU migration and asylum policy, which are 
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closely linked to border security and free-
dom of movement in terms of both content 
and politics, will not be defused in the 
coming months. The central issue of how 
asylum seekers are to be distributed within 
the EU can probably only be circumvented 
through voluntary coalitions. Reception 
centres and preliminary assessments near 
the border will be even more difficult to 
implement with a view to the new require-
ments for health protection. Before new 
approaches for a more crisis-resistant Euro-
pean asylum system are pursued, it is im-
perative that the remaining access possi-
bilities for persons seeking protection be 
maintained. This applies to all EU and 
Schengen states. 
The reform of the Schengen Borders 
Code should be relaunched in autumn. 
Beyond fixed time limits, coordination 
between the Schengen states must be im-
proved. For example, the EU mechanism 
for “integrated political crisis management” 
based on the solidarity clause (Art. 222 TFEU) 
could be used more systematically. In par-
ticular, the proportionality of prolonged 
internal border controls should be more 
closely reviewed. The dialogue between the 
EU Commission and neighbouring states 
affected by national measures can be struc-
tured more efficiently and made more 
binding. 
Finally, member states must agree on 
the procedures or tools to be used for health-
related checks on persons. The ECDC could 
play a greater role and be taken into account 
in provisions of the EU’s Free Movement 
Directive. Frontex must also expand its 
remit to protect the health of refugees and 
its own staff. 
The Covid crisis could thus be used to 
strengthen the common legal framework 
and the European value of the free move-
ment of Union citizens. 
Dr Raphael Bossong is an Associate in the EU / Europe Division. 
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